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I was intrigued in the course of recent research into early con-
stitutional decisions by Irving Dillard's indignant rejection of the
assertion that Gabriel Duvall was "'probably the most insignifi-
cant of all Supreme Court Judges.' -1 Since Mr. Dilliard does not
suggest which Justice or Justices were more insignificant than Du-
vall, I have made a preliminary investigation of my own.
I acknowledge at the outset the highly subjective nature of the
inquiry. Insignificance, as every Chicago Cub supporter knows, is
in the eye of the beholder. Yet every baseball town has its particu-
lar favorites: the shortstop who regularly threw the ball into the
lower grandstand; the pitcher who habitually walked batters when
the bases were loaded; the slugger who struck out whenever he
came up with men on base.2 In hopes of identifying individuals of
comparable stature in the judicial field, I have devised a set of Ob-
jective Indicators of Insignificance ("OI"), which, I am modestly
confident, will provide the most skeptical reader with substantial
scientific support for my more informal assessments of candidates
for the coveted laurels of Most Insignificant Justice.
It seems only appropriate to begin with Duvall himself, not
only because Dilliard's unsubstantiated attack on his record pro-
voked the present inquiry, but more importantly, because impar-
tial examination of Duvall's performance reveals to even the unini-
tiated observer that he achieved an enviable standard of
insignificance against which all other Justices must be measured.
Before attempting to make the case for Duvall, however, I
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I should like to thank none
of my colleagues for help in composing this seminal article. None of them appeared to take
it seriously.
IDilliard, Gabriel Duvall, in 1 Tan JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1789-1969, at 419, 428 (H. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969) (quoting E. BATES, THs- STORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT 109 (1936)).
2 Cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 262-63 (1972), where Justice Blackmun listed over 80
baseball players "celebrated for one reason or another," and where two Justices, id. at 285,
dissented from the list. See also Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule,
123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1474 passim (1975).
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should like to set to one side a number of contenders who attained
a high level of invisibility simply because they had the unfair ad-
vantage of never getting off the ground. In this category we find
such luminaries as Thomas Johnson of Maryland (1791-93), s who
drew his salary during a period when the Court had no cases to
decide and who resigned after two years "rather than undertake
the labor,' 4 and Robert Trimble of Kentucky (1826-28), 5 who con-
trived to perish in his third year on -the Bench, and who in contrib-
uting a respectable opinion in Ogden v. Saunders6 had already dis-
qualified himself by doing more than a number of his brethren
whose years of service quintupled his own. Entitled to honorable
mention as the only known Justice who missed two opportunities
to become truly insignificant is the South Carolinian John Rut-
ledge (1789-91 and 1795),7 who when first appointed "[r]esigned
without ever sitting,"8 and who upon being named Chief Justice
several years later sat only on circuit before managing to persuade
the Senate that his increasing mental instability was a sufficient
ground for refusing to confirm him.9 To be insignificant for one or
two years, however, is child's play; to maintain a profile of insignif-
icance over a period of a decade or more is an accomplishment of
high order.
Reasons of delicacy, it should be added, preclude Considera-
tion of any Justice who sat within the past thirty years, lest the
subconscious desire to curry favor exaggerate or be thought to have
exaggerated an assessment of the insignificance of some recent in-
cumbent or of his friends.10 Finally, my evaluations are based
solely upon decisions on matters of constitutional law, since those
are the only ones I have read; my conclusions must be taken with
the reservation that some Justice who preserved an impeccably
bland profile in constitutional cases may have spoiled it by expos-
I G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. A, at A-1 (10th ed.
1980).
' 1 C. WARREN, THE SuPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 85-86 (2d ed. 1926).
Actually, what Johnson was griping about was circuit riding, which did demand the expen-
diture of time. Fairness in reporting, however, is a luxury.
G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-2.
* 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 313-31 (1827).
7 G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-1.
a Id.
* 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 136-37.
10 It should also be added that the increased use of law clerks makes it ever more un-
likely that future Justices will match the insignificance attained by some of their predeces-
sors; it surely cannot be an easy task to achieve true insignificance with three or four of the
country's brightest young lawyers buzzing about one's chambers.
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ing himself shamelessly in some other field of law.
With these introductory observations I turn to my first candi-
date for Most Insignificant Justice ("MIJ"), Gabriel Duvall. It
speaks well for his candidacy that there is a threshold uncertainty
as to the proper spelling of his name; it seems unlikely that anyone
of much significance as recently as the nineteenth century could
have made such a claim. In the teeth of annual flyleaf notations by
Reporters Cranch, Wheaton, and Peters uniformly employing the
form "Duvall,"" Marshall's biographer, Albert Beveridge, stub-
bornly insisted, without citation of authority, on spelling the name
with a single "l.'12 Mr. Dilliard, however, who for some unaccount-
able reason actually traced the family history, concluded persua-
sively that the original "DuVal" or "Duval" employed in earlier
generations had become "Duvall" before the future Justice was
born. s I therefore am inclined to dismiss Mr. Beveridge's contrary
view as the effort of a partisan observer unable to resist making his
favorite appear more forgotten than he actually was.
Whether Duvall's name could be spelled either by his contem-
poraries or by later historians, in any event, is at best an indirect
indicator of true insignificance," which is best assessed directly by
an examination of his record. Appointed in 1811, Duvall endured
until 1835.15 In constitutional cases he was recorded as having de-
livered one opinion in twenty-five years, and it can be quoted in
full: "DuvALL, Justice, dissented."1 8  The occasion was the
Dartmouth College case,17 in which three of his colleagues had
written opinions totaling ninety pages to explain that the state had
impaired the college's charter; Duvall managed to dispute them all
in just three words.
On even the uninitiated eye, I submit, this brief but exhaus-
" See volumes 11-33 of the United States Reports.
12 4 A. BEvERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MA1SHALL 60 n.1 (1919).
13 See Dilliard, supra note 1, at 420-21.
" In the same category is Dilliard's revelation that Duvall "was the only one eligible
who was omitted from the original twenty volumes of the Dictionary of American Biogra-
phy." Id. at 428.
1" See G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-2. The traditional term "served" has been delib-
erately avoided in this study because it appears to imply some contribution to the work of
the Court and therefore to prejudice an impartial inquiry.
"e Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 713 (1819)
(Duvall, J., dissenting) (4th ed. 1902). It is tempting to interpret Wheaton's capitalization as
an editorial comment on the epochal breaking of Duvall's eight-year silence, but a few pages
earlier one finds similarly archaic references to "MARSHALL" and "STORY," neither of whom
remotely approached Duvall's record of taciturnity. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 624, 666 (4th
ed. 1902).
17 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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tive restatement of Duvall's record must make a striking impres-
sion. To encumber the highest bench for a quarter of a century
without leaving any deeper imprint than Duvall did is the mark of
a very special judge. Application of the objective indicator of insig-
nificance PPY (Pages Per Year), however, will quickly confirm in
more scientific terms the true extent of Duvall's accomplishment.
Duvall sat for twenty-five years and wrote three words. Three
words in the type face employed by Wheaton in 1819 occupied a
little less than half a line;18 on the page preceding Duvall's dissent
there were twenty-two lines. 19 Thus Duvall's output (P) totaled
0.02 pages20 and his years (Y) 25; his PPY ( P - Y) is therefore
0.02 + 25, or 0.0008.21 For the reader who is not mathematically
inclined, this amounts to eight ten-thousandths of a page per year
over a sustained period-an enviable record of insignificance that I
think all will agree can be taken as a standard of comparison.
Ignoring the misleading perfect PPY scores of such fleeting
figures as Thomas Johnson and John Rutledge for reasons already
given, we find that Duvall had several serious rivals in terms of
the critical PPY among his own brethren. For much of the time
during which Duvall sat, thanks to John Marshall's insistence on
writing everything himself, the Supreme Court was popularly
known as "John Marshall and the Six Dwarfs."2 3 Of Marshall's col-
leagues only Joseph Story and William Johnson managed to say
very much of interest-the latter by having the temerity to dis-
agree on rare occasions with the party line24 and the former essen-
tially by waiting until Marshall was either disqualified25 or dead.2"
" See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 713 (4th ed. 1883). Ideally one should correct for variability
of type size from volume to volume; I shall do so, however, only upon a showing that some
other Justice enjoyed such a facially astounding PPY as that of Duvall.
11 Id. at 712.
20 I have taken the liberty of rounding off to the nearest hundredth of a page. For those






" See supra notes 3, 4, 7, 9 and accompanying text.
I3  say "was" in the confident expectation that future scholars will adopt this handy
characterization after reading this article. Feel free to use it, preferably with the appropriate
attribution, i.e., Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. Cm.
L. Rav. 466, 469 (1983).
24 See D. MORGAN, JUS7CE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSzmzR passim (1954).
25 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 323-62 (1816).
"' Marshall died in 1835; Story determinedly sat for another 10 years. See G. GuNTHER,
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Bushrod Washington, in contrast, who was on the Court even
longer than was Duvall,27 managed to remain completely inactive
in constitutional cases from 1798 until 1820, a period of uninter-
rupted quiescence very likely unequalled in the history of the
Court-only to blow it all by writing a full handful of extensive
and unfortunately well-crafted opinions once old age had evidently
weakened his resolution. 28 Brockholst Livingston, who maintained
a tomblike silence throughout his seventeen years in Washington,"
demonstrates the danger of relying on Supreme Court PPY alone
as a measure of overall insignificance: his circuit-court opinions re-
veal him to have been in fact a closet overachiever who in at least
one instance sat slyly by while Marshall delivered for the whole
Court an opinion inferior to that which Livingston had already
prepared in the boondocks."0 Harder to dismiss is Thomas Todd of
Kentucky, whose unblemished muteness outdid even that of Liv-
ingston by two long years,$1 who therefore has probably the longest
sustained zero PPY of any Justice, and who is not known to have
disqualified himself by writing anything of significance on circuit.3 2
Once again, however, it is well to bear in mind that PPY, though
scientifically derived, is not an end in itself but merely one tool for
assessing overall insignificance. I appeal to the reader's sense of
fair play in asking whether a single lapse of three words in a
twenty-five-year career should be permitted to outweigh the fact
that Duvall had twenty-four years of total anonymity, and Todd
had only nineteen.33
supra note 3, at A-2.
27 Washington was on the Court from 1798 until 1829. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 3,
at A-2. For Duvall's duration on the Court, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
" E.g., Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). See Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 646,
702-05 (1982).
2, Livingston was on the Court from 1806 until 1823. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at
A-2. For a discussion of his activity there (or lack thereof), see Currie, supra note 28, pas-
sim; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers,
1801-1835, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 887 passim (1982).
30 See Currie, supra note 29, at 915 (discussing Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. 141, 143-44
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 66)).
S Todd was on the Court from 1807 until 1826. G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-2.
" Actually I haven't looked. Thus the statement in the text is accurate: Todd is "not
known" (by me) "to have written anything of significance on circuit." I take further comfort
from the conclusion of a leading study of the period that Todd's overall contributions were
"minimal." G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 391 (1981).
3 If all else fails I should be forced to insist that we are not certain that Duvall actually
uttered the three words ("DuvArL, Justice, dissented") that he is accused of having uttered
in the Dartmouth College case, see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Indeed the
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Duvall's detractors seldom fail to emphasize that he, like John
Rutledge, 4 had an unfair advantage: it was easy for him not to
deliver opinions since, as Dilliard puts it, in his later years he was
"'so deaf as to be unable to participate in conversation.' " The
analogy to Rutledge, however, seems strained. Rutledge had the
easy excuse for inaction that during most of his potentially produc-
tive years he was not a member of the Court and therefore was not
legally entitled to deliver its opinions. There is no proof, in con-
trast, that Duvall was either dead or unable to speak while on the
Court, and it is by no means uncommon for judges to deliver
lengthy opinions on matters they do not begin to understand. On
the quantitative scale of PPY, therefore, modified by common
sense and a spirit of fair play, Duvall seems to me far and away the
most insignificant of his colleagues during the time of Chief Justice
Marshall.
As we move to the more egalitarian times of later Chief Jus-
tices, 6 when mere Associate Justices were increasingly allowed to
open their mouths, we have great difficulty finding rivals to the
original Dwarfs in terms of PPY. In a sense the achievements of all
of Marshall's colleagues should be to some extent discounted: no
later Justice had the same advantage of serving under a Chief Jus-
tice who deprived him of pencils.3 7 In this light it seems to me that
in terms of PPY weighted according to opportunity Duvall en-
peculiar phraseology employed strongly suggests he did not; unusual as it was for Duvall to
speak at all, it would have been still more unusual for him to speak of himself in the third
person and in the past tense. It seems more probable that the Reporter was paraphrasing an
actual opinion of only two words (e.g., "I [i.e., Justice Duvall] dissent."). This fact alone, if it
is a fact (my hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that different reports of the case contain
varying versions of the opinion, see, e.g., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 713 (1st ed. New York
1819) (Duvall, J., dissenting) ("Mr. Justice Duvall dissented") (emphasis added)), would
have the effect of reducing Duvall's already impressive PPY by fully one third (actually,
more than a third; PPY is based on space, not number of words, and "I" is far smaller than
"DuvALL, Justice"). Indeed, for all we know, Wheaton may simply have misinterpreted a
sneeze by Duvall after the Chief Justice asked whether anybody disagreed with the major-
ity's decision. Whether Duvall actually sneezed, I hasten to add, is a matter of conjecture. I
do not rely on it for my conclusion.
" See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
"Dilliard, supra note 1, at 427 (quoting the admittedly "young" and inexperienced
Charles Sumner).
' Analogy might suggest (cf. attorneys-general, mothers-in-law) that the correct plural
form is Chiefs Justice. The resolution of this issue, fortunately, is beyond the scope of the
present study.
37 This feat demonstrates once again the enormous ingenuity of the great Chief Justice,
for it is by no means clear that the pencil had yet been invented. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing... to... Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries . ... "
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counters a most serious rival in Justice John McKinley of Ken-
tucky, who was nominally a member of the Court for fifteen long
years after Marshall's departure (1837-52)"' and who left practi-
cally no trace.
I think it can be said without fear of contradiction that the
name John McKinley is not a household word. He authored in
those quiescent years not one opinion for the Court in a constitu-
tional case; as Professor Swisher has succinctly observed, McKin-
ley "seldom wrote opinions of any kind."3 He probably stands
alone as having missed four entire Terms of the Supreme Court40
while he was a member of that body, 41 once giving as his justifica-
tion that he had pressing business on circuit.' 2 Upon McKinley's
death Chief Justice Taney paid him the tellingly lukewarm compli-
ment of having been "faithful and assiduous" when he managed to
attend,4' and Professor Swisher was able in his monumental study
of the period to conclude without qualification that in his entire
career McKinley "made no significant contribution to legal think-
ing in any form. '"4
Nevertheless, despite his obvious achievements, even McKin-
ley was no real rival to Duvall in strict PPY terms, for in fifteen
years he did produce two uninspired separate opinions amounting
to twelve pages.45 His PPY of 0.8000,46 although very likely the
:8 See G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-3.
9 C. SwisHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 120 (1974).
40 See 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at vii (3d ed. 1899); 42 U.S. (1 How.) following title page (2d ed.
1883); 47 U.S. (6 How.) following title page (2d ed. 1884); 49 U.S. (8 How.) at iii (2d ed.
1884). See also C. SwIsHER, supra note 39, at 463 ("Justice McKinley's attendance was
never more than sporadic.").
41 Others, of course, missed even more Terms either before their appointment or after
their resignation, or both.
42 See 49 U.S. (8 How.) at iii (2d ed. 1884). If this is true, of course, it detracts from the
significance of his absence. Cf. supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing Living-
ston, J.). The abolition of circuit riding in 1911 gave to later Justices an immeasurable ad-
vantage comparable to the impact on batting averages of the introduction of the live ball.
43 55 U.S. (14 How.) at v. Taney's actual words were "while his health was sufficient to
undergo the labor."
" C. SwisHER, supra note 39, at 67.
5 See (only) Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 597-606 (1839) (McKin-
ley, J., dissenting); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 452-55 (1849) (McKinley, J.,
concurring). Neither opinion addressed the constitutional provisions that were in issue.
46 P = (606 - 597) + (455 - 452) = 9 + 3 = 12. See supra note 45. Y = 1852 - 1837 =
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lowest of any Justice of long tenure who was equipped with a pen-
cil, remains a thousand times that of Duvall. 7 If later comers were
to have a sporting chance to be recognized as MIJ, therefore, it was
necessary to devise additional OII to take into account the fact
that insignificance can be manifested in a variety of ways. For it is
widely accepted among scholars-though to my knowledge it has
never been scientifically demonstrated-that not all pages of words
are of equal intellectual value. Thus I have developed the addi-
tional parameter IPP (Inanities Per Page) in an effort to evaluate
the qualitative as well as the quantitative component of
insignificance.
In terms of IPP, it should be noted, Justice Duvall does not
fare nearly so well. His one opinion, it will be remembered,"8 read
in its entirety "DuvALL, Justice, dissented." Favorable though I am
to Duvall's cause, candor requires the concession that there is
nothing particularly inane about this opinion. Although a critic
with nothing better to do with his time than to read long opinions
might perhaps have quibbled for a somewhat fuller statement of
reasons, I submit that it is difficult to point to a single misstate-
ment or even ambiguity in the entire pronouncement-a statement
I would not have the audacity to make of any of the three other
opinions in the case. Indeed the persistent Mr. Dilliard has gone to
the length of arguing that Duvall's unusual brevity in the
Dartmouth College case was evidence of extraordinary pugnacity
and independence of mind: by saying so little the Justice "showed
what he thought of Webster's long oratorical plea before the bench
and of Chief Justice Marshall's pioneering decision for the Su-
preme Court' 49-i.e., not much. In my opinion Dilliard has once
more gone too far; his wholly unsupported conjecture may, I be-
lieve, be disregarded as the wishful thinking of a less than impar-
tial observer. But the fact remains that Duvall does not rank high
on the scale of inanities per page.
To illustrate the importance of IPP as an independent index
of insignificance, I should like to discuss briefly the case of Justice
Nathan Clifford, who occupied the bench for over twenty years be-
tween 1858 and 1881.50 On the PPY scale Clifford was no threat to
Duvall, for he wrote incessantly. However, he also wrote with less
persuasive effect, so far as my limited researches have yet revealed,
" See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
48 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 33.
4 Dilliard, supra note 1, at 420.
" See G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-3.
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than anyone else who ever sat on the supreme bench.
This is extravagant praise indeed, and the reader is entitled to
supporting evidence. At the outset let me observe-without at-
tempting to evade my responsibility-that IPP is a great deal more
difficult to measure than PPY. In the first place, to determine the
former it is necessary actually to read the opinions, which (espe-
cially in the case of a Justice who ranks high on the IPP scale) can
be a considerable burden. In addition, inanity is a more subjective
concept than the number of words emitted; perhaps in a thorough
study one should attempt to quantify it in terms of certain key
words (e.g., "whereas," "party of the second part," "fairness," etc.)
that all competent observers would agree are sure-fire indicators of
an inferior mind. Until such more objective indicators are devel-
oped, however, I shall make the case for Clifford on a more subjec-
tive basis. 1
One prime example of Clifford's craft was his entirely super-
fluous forty-seven-page dissenting opinion in the Legal Tender
Cases52 in 1871. There, the reader will recall, the Court by a five-
to-four margin overruled a precedent from the preceding Term 8
and upheld Congress's authority to make paper money legal tender
for public and private debts. Chief Justice Chase, who had written
the earlier opinion, repeated his exhaustive arguments that the
tender provision was not necessary to the exercise of any congres-
sional power, that it offended the spirit of the Constitution, and
that it deprived creditors of their property without due process of
law.54 Justice Field added a long dissent of his own, 5 and Clifford
sprang manfully into the nonexistent breach.
"Money, in the constitutional sense," he began, "means coins
of gold and silver fabricated and stamped by authority of law as a
measure of value, pursuant to the power vested in Congress by the
Constitution." 6 Standing alone, this passage may not appear par-
ticularly inane; its true value begins to emerge only when one con-
siders that the word "Money" nowhere appears in the relevant
61 Cf. Justice Stewart's famous statement with respect to "hard-core pornography" in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring): "I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description;... [b]ut I know it when I see it. . . ." (emphasis added).
5- 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 587-634 (1871). But cf. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981
Sup. CT. REv. 367, 390 ("Justice Clifford doubtless came closer to the mark" than did Chief
Justice Chase).
53 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 570-87 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
"Id. at 634-81 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 587 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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provisions of the Constitution.57 Clifford might as pertinently have
begun by stating that "dogs, in the constitutional sense, are dan-
gerous mammalian quadrupeds that sully my lawn." 58
Deftly turning still further from the issue before him, Clifford
began with obvious relish to describe in considerable detail the
terms of the statute establishing the mint in 1792. I quote in full
his remarkably trenchant description of the coins initially author-
ized to be minted:
First, gold coins, to wit: Eagles of the value of ten dollars or
units; half-eagles of the value of five dollars; quarter-eagles of
the value of two and a half dollars, the act specifying in each
case the number of grains and fractions of a grain the coin
shall contain, whether fabricated from pure or standard gold.
Second, silver coins, to wit: "DOLLARS OR UNITS," each to
contain 371 grains and 4/16ths part of a grain of pure silver,
or 416 grains of standard silver. Like provision is also made
for the coinage of half-dollars, quarter-dollars, dimes, and
half-dimes, and also for coinage of certain copper coins, but it
is not necessary to enter much into those details in this case.5 9
No, it was not necessary; indeed one would have thought the entire
tedious recitation added nothing whatever on the question of
whether Congress might make something other than gold or silver
legal tender.60
Beginning on the very next page of the same opinion, more-
over, we find the following remarkable sentence:
Completed, as the circle of measures adopted by Congress
were, to put the new government into successful operation, by
the passage of that act, it will be instructive to take a brief
review of the important events which occurred within the pe-
riod of ten years next preceding its passage, or of the ten
years next following the time when that measure was first pro-
67 It does appear in the borrowing clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, but nobody
disputed that what the Government was arguably borrowing when it issued tender notes was
"Money." There is also, of course, a clause authorizing Congress "To coin Money," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5, but the majority did not rely on it, and it was certainly easier to
point out that paper money was not "coin[ed]" than to argue that it was not money at all.
Cf. infra note 70.
51 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 593 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
"'Note also the crafty use (on two distinct but parallel occasions) of the useless and
stilted term "to wit." Cf. the discussion of the "sure-fire indicators of an inferior mind,"
supra text preceding note 51.
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posed in the Congress of the Confederation. 1
Quite apart from the important substantive fact that Clifford was
here continuing his journey into a blind alley, and apart from the
interesting question whether he was planning to move forward or
backward in time, we encounter in this single sentence abundant
evidence of the surpassing inanity of Justice Clifford's style. Most
striking is the blatant use of a plural verb with a singular subject
("the circle . . . were"), which is almost too obvious a mistake to
be taken at face value. More subtle, in contrast, is the exquisitely
dangling participle, half concealed by the intervention of three es-
sentially incomprehensible clauses between subject and modifier:
"Completed, . . . it will be instructive. . . ." One is reminded of
the classic textbook example: "Foaming at the mouth, I saw the
dog cross the road. '62
One further exemplary passage will close this cursory exami-
nation of Clifford's Legal Tender opinion:
Comprehensive, however, as the power of Federal taxation is,
being without limitation as to amount, still there are some re-
strictions as to the manner of its exercise, and some excep-
tions as to the objects to which it may be applied. Bills for
raising revenue must originate in the House of Representa-
tives; duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform throughout
the United States; direct taxes must be apportioned according
to numbers; regulations of commerce and revenue shall not
give any preference to the ports of one State over those of
another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be
obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another; nor shall any
tax or duty be laid on articles exported from any State. 3
Lest the truly unique inanity of this entirely accurate enumer-
ation escape the inattentive reader, it should be emphasized that it
appeared in a case that had nothing whatever to do with federal
taxes.
Clifford's detractors like to argue that in his later years he be-
61 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 594-95 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
6 Cf. W. STRUNK & E. WHrrE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 14 (3d ed. 1979) ("Being in a
dilapidated condition, I was able to buy the house very cheap."); H. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY
OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 660 (2d ed. 1965) ("Handing me my whisky, his face broke into
an awkward smile .... ."). There remains a nagging doubt as to the antecedent of the criti-
cal term "its passage" in the Clifford quotation. Only the context makes it even reasonably
clear that this "it" refers to the "act" mentioned in the preceding clause and not to the
otherwise unspecified "it" that Clifford had in the meantime said "will be instructive."
63 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 631 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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came wordy and unfocused, 4 but the record does not support this
facile denigration. After all, the Legal Tender opinion itself was
written at a time when Clifford had a full eleven years more to
sit, 5 and it was no isolated instance; comparable opinions au-
thored during the same relatively early period in Clifford's career
are briefly noted"6 in the margin. 7 Numerous additional examples
might be given,"s but I think the point has been made; without at
this preliminary stage attempting to assign a numerical value to
Justice Clifford's IPP, he seems to me to rank significantly higher
on this important scale of insignificance than the almost inaudible
Duvall. "
" E.g., C. MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 260-61 (1963).
Cf. C. FA RMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 108-09 (1939), protesting (too
loudly?) that it was not true that Clifford was "no better than a nonentity."
" See supra notes 50, 52 and accompanying text.
" The inquiring reader (if one exists) may wish to take a peek at Waring v. Mayor of
Mobile, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110 (1869), in which Clifford slogged for several pages through the
entire body of statutes governing imports without faintly attempting to relate them to the
case and then disposed of the actual issue of state power under the Import-Export clause in
a single conclusory paragraph; The State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204 (1871),
where he stated no fewer than five times that the question was whether the tax in use was a
property tax or a duty on tonnage before reaching the difficult conclusion that it was the
latter because assessed according to the tonnage of the ship; and Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23
Wall.) 331, 347-48 (1875), where in a single sentence Clifford concluded that a succession tax
was not "direct" because an income tax that had already been held not to be "cannot be
distinguished in principle"--without bothering to tell us why.
67 Actually, of course, these examples are not noted "in the margin"; "margin" is in this
instance a legal fiction for "footnote," as marginal notes in the literal sense went out about
the same time as Justice Todd, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Figuratively,
however, a large percentage of footnotes in the typical legal paper can fairly be described as
"marginal" in the sense that they might better have been omitted. But see, e.g., Comment,
The General Mining Law and the Doctrine of Pedis Possessio: The Case for Congressional
Action, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 1026, 1038 n.81 (1982) (citing this author). Needless to say, this
argument is inapplicable to the present article. Cf. Blum, Some Marginal Notes on TMT
Trailer Ferry Reorganization: The New Math?, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 77. See generally P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 433-37 (10th ed. 1976) (discussing marginal utility).
"Several years previously, while carelessly contriving to make the substantively unob-
jectionable argument that a federal ship license that had been held to preclude the con-
struction of a bridge over the Ohio River forbade the construction of one over the Schuylkill
as well, Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 733-34 (1865) (Clifford, J., dissent-
ing), he had displayed promise of considerable inanity by his unique disdain for the use of
the definite article: "Injury alleged is .... Bridge about to be erected is .... Statement of
complaint is .... Allegation of the bill of complaint also is. . . ." Clifford managed to be
quite inconsistent in his eccentricity, as illustrated by the quoted reference to "Allegation of
the bill of complaint" (emphasis added); here he omitted the article once and employed it
once in identical contexts within a single phrase.
" The judgment of his contemporaries tends to confirm that they ranked Clifford un-
usually high on the scale of insignificance: three consecutive Chief Justices (Taney, Chase,
and Waite) steadfastly refused to assign him anything of importance to write, and the Re-
porter, Wallace, wondered despairingly whether there had ever before been "'such a man
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I have said enough, I think, to suggest something of the value
of IPP to counterbalance PPY as an objective indicator of insignif-
icance. One problem that has no doubt occurred to the reader is
how to compare Justices with low PPYs (e.g., Duvall) with those
scoring high on the IPP scale (e.g., Clifford). I confess to having no
ready answer. I can, however; propose additional OII by which the
same Justices can be tested to break possible ties.
The first of these indicators I have called EHH? (Ever Heard
of Him?). EHH? should be measured by modern double-blind pol-
ling techniques by submitting to the man"0 in the street 1 (EHH?s )
and to a cross-section of law professors (EHH?p) a list of individu-
als and asking them to pick out all those on the list who have ever
been members of the Supreme Court. Those who are properly
identified by the man in the street can be eliminated from the con-
test as obviously of some significance; those not known to twenty
percent of the law professors are serious contenders indeed.
I should caution those who wish to attempt this test that its
accuracy depends upon extreme care in devising the list from
which the Justices 'are to be selected. My first experimental list, for
example, a representative portion of which is reproduced in the
margin,7 '2 had to be abandoned after a short trial, for the preva-
lence of such names as Dolly Madison, Dred Scott, and George
Burns quickly led the man in the street 5 to the correct conclusion
that everybody he did not recognize was a former Supreme Court
Justice.
The secret of a good questionnaire is to be sneaky. There must
be Justices everyone remembers, like John Marshall; there must be
names of people one is likely to think might or should have been
. . . in such a place."' C. FAIRMAN, supra note 64, at 382 (quoting letter from John Wallace
to William Maury (Nov. 9, 1880)) (emphasis omitted). Field, in delivering yet a third dissent
in the familiar Legal Tender Cases, prefaced his pronouncement with the statement that "I
agree with the Chief Justice in the views expressed in his opinion in these cases"-pointedly
omitting to say the same of the views that had meanwhile been expressed by Clifford in
what must have been the immediately preceding three hours. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 634
(Field, J., dissenting).
70 The term "man" includes "woman." See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). It does not include dogs.
I do not like dogs. Cf. note 58 and accompanying text. For a contrary opinion, see B. WooD-
HOUSE, No BAD DAYs (1980).
71 "Street" is here used in the colloquial sense only. It is not essential that the inter-
views actually be conducted in the street. Indeed I should advise against doing so in light of
the traffic laws, the unavoidable length of the questionnaire, and the fact that dogs sully the
street nearly as often as they sully my lawn.
7' George Washington, George Shiras, Howell Jackson, Joe DiMaggio, John McKinley,
Hawley Smoot, Hester Prynne, Pontius Pilate, Big Bill Broonzy.
73 See supra notes 70, 71 and accompanying text.
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Justices, like Learned Hand and Daniel Webster; there must be
people whose names are easily confused with those of actual Jus-
tices, like Edward Livingston, Caleb Cushing, and John Chipman
Gray; there should be a misleading plethora of people named John-
son (Andrew, Michael, Thomas, William, and Pearl). Most impor-
tant of all, there should be a substantial number of people (real or
imaginary) who, like Wayne Terwilliger and Emil Verban, have
achieved a substantial measure of anonymity in other pastures. In
such carefully controlled surroundings, I submit, Justices like
Howell Jackson, John Blair, and Samuel Blatchford may find a
true test of their own obscurity.
My two remaining OII are NORBB (Number of References by
Byrnes) and BVD (Benightedness of View). James F. Byrnes
(1941-42)74 had one of the shortest Supreme Court careers of any
Justice; anyone whose opinions got cited by Justice Byrnes in such
a short time (his own colleagues excluded) cannot have been truly
insignificant. Benightedness of View, like Inanities Per Page, is a
more elusive quality, but I think one must rank high on this scale
Justice Pierce Butler, who is best known to generations of law
students for his totally unexplained dissent from the eminently
reasonable conclusion of all his brethren that "[t]hree generations
of imbeciles are enough. ' '76
In closing this preliminary report I cannot be restrained from
making special mention of several other Justices who deserve a
high place in the ranks of the insignificant. Prominent among them
despite his relatively brief service is Alfred Moore of North Caro-
lina (1799-1804), 77 whom I dismissed in a study of the pre-Mar-
shall era as one who "belong[ed] essentially to the Marshall pe-
riod" 8 and in articles about the Marshall Court as a holdover from
earlier days.79 Also worthy of mention are the two Justices La-
mar, 0 each so little known that their meager judicial output is
commonly thought to be the work of one man; one of them has also
the distinction of having had more first names than any other Jus-
71 G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-6.
75 Butler was on the Court from 1922 until 1939. See id.
7' Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (Butler, J., dissenting).
77G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-2.
78 Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 819,
820 (1981).
7' Currie, supra note 28, at 646; Currie, supra note 29, at 970.
s5 L. Lamar was on the Court from 1888 until 1893, J. Lamar from 1910 until 1916. See
G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-4, A-5.
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tice would admit to, all three of them in Latin.81 Moody, Lurton,
Shiras, Day, and Clarke; Cushing, who was senile, 2 and Baldwin,
who was mad; 3 these are names to be remembered in song and
story, lest they not be remembered at all.
I shall take reluctant leave of my subject at this point, chas-
tened that I have not been able to reach a definitive conclusion as
to the relative demerits of such admirable candidates as Duvall,
Clifford, and McKinley, yet hopeful that my tentative and incom-
plete efforts may encourage other scholars to give this fascinating
question the attention it truly deserves.
81 Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus. See Paul, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, in 2
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 1431, 1431 (H. Friedman
& F. Israel eds. 1969). The other Lamar was Joseph R. G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at A-5.
82 See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 400. As early as 1804 his Brother Johnson had
described Cushing as "'incompetent."' See D. MORGAN, supra note 24, at 182 (quoting let-
ter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822)). John Dickinson wrote that
Cushing "'concurred with the majority of the judges and did not add to their exposition of
the law."' G. HASTINGS & H. JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 84 (quoting J. Dickinson).
8S See C. SwisHER, supra note 39, at 50-52 & n.53 (quoting Taney's fear lest the
"'evil"' "'temper of Judge Baldwin's opinions ... grow'" to the point where "'[i]t will
... be necessary to take some step to guard the tribunal from misconstruction' ").
